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Abstract
We investigate whether the set of available enforcement mechanisms a¤ects the formation
of risk sharing relations by applying dyadic regression analysis to data from a specically
designed behavioural experiment, two surveys and a genealogical mapping exercise. During
the experiment participants are invited to form risk sharing relations under three institutional
environments, each associated with di¤erent enforcement mechanisms: external, intrinsic,
and endogenous extrinsic, i.e., the threat of (partial) social exclusion. Dyads who are similar
in age and gender, genetically related, or who belong to the same organizations with an
economic purpose are more likely to share risk. However, the latter are associated with
less risk sharing when endogenous extrinsic incentives can be applied, while co-membership
in religious congregations and being related by marriage support enforcement through such
incentives. We nd no evidence of assortative grouping on risk preferences but, ex post,
co-group membersrisk-taking behavior converges.
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1 Introduction
It is common for households to pool risk, for instance through mutual insurance arrangements
(e.g. Foster and Rosenzweig 2001, Fafchamps and Lund 2003, De Weerdt and Fafchamps 2007)
and group loans with joint liability (e.g. Besley and Coate 1995, Ghatak 2000, Ghatak 1999,
Morduch 1999). The way in which risk pooling arrangements are enforced varies with the insti-
tutional and legal environment. Informal arrangements, such as those that exist among friends
and relatives, are thought to be enforced through a mix of quid pro quo, altruism, and adher-
ence to social norms (e.g. Coate and Ravallion 1993, Cox and Fafchamps 2007, Platteau 1994).
Formal arrangements, such as insurance contracts and funeral societies, combine the above
with external enforcement through courts and other adjudication processes (e.g. De Weerdt and
Dercon 2006, De Weerdt, Dercon, Bold and Pankhurst 2006). What remains unclear is the
extent to which the nature of the available enforcement mechanisms a¤ects who pools risk with
whom and whether and how this, in turn, a¤ects subsequent risk taking behavior. We investigate
these questions using a behavioral eld experiment designed specically for this purpose.
Since the seminal work of Kimball (1988) and Coate and Ravallion (1993), the theoretical
literature has modeled informal risk sharing as a repeated game between self-interested parties
(e.g. Kocherlakota 1996, Ligon, Thomas and Worrall 2001, Foster and Rosenzweig 2001). More
recently the role of intrinsic incentives such as altruism and guilt has also been investigated
(e.g. Altonji, Hayashi and Kotliko¤ 1992, Ravallion and Dearden 1988, Cox 1987, Cox, Eser
and Jimenez 1998, Cox and Fafchamps 2007). This theoretical literature predicts that external
enforcement facilitates risk sharing between relative strangers, i.e., individuals who have little
knowledge of each other and have little reason to care about one anothers wellbeing, because
it overcomes the limitations imposed by intrinsic incentives and enforcement constraints.1
1The reader is referred to Genicot and Ray (2003) and Bloch, Genicot and Ray (2004) for a detailed discussion
2
Also relevant is the theoretical literature on joint liability loans Ghatak (1999) as the joint
liability agreement is e¤ectively a risk sharing arrangement. Here, we see that individuals may
sort into joint liability groups assortatively with respect to risk attitudes: individuals who are
highly risk averse, and have safe portfolios as a result, may prefer not to pool risk with individuals
who are risk loving and thus have risky portfolios and vice-versa. Applying the same reasoning,
Ho¤ (1996) shows that heterogeneous risk attitudes may lead to less than full risk pooling, even
when enforcement is perfect.
The purpose of this paper is to test these predictions using data from a controlled behav-
ioral eld experiment. The advantage of using an experimental approach is that it facilitates
causal inference. However, the approach requires that the participating subjects be placed in a
somewhat articial decision-making environment. This may cast doubt on whether the behav-
ior observed during the experiment bears any resemblance to the corresponding behavior as it
naturally arises (Bardsley 2005). We minimize this potential drawback in three ways. First, we
involve in the experiment villagers who are known to engage in informal risk sharing. Second,
each experimental session is conducted in a single village, thereby ensuring that the participants
are interacting with people they already know. Third, the experiment is designed to allow face-
to-face, rather than anonymous, interaction. A comparison of the experimental results with real
risk sharing within a sub-sample of villages indicates that these measures were at least partially
successful (Barr and Genicot 2008).
The experiment is divided into two rounds, played over two consecutive days. In the rst
round, participants independently play a version of Binswangers risk preference elicitation game
(Binswanger 1980). In the second round, participants play the game a second time but are
o¤ered, ex ante, the opportunity to form risk sharing groups, i.e., groups within which the
of the limitations imposed by self-enforcement constraints on the formation of risk sharing networks.
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proceeds of all membersgambles are shared equally. The institutional environment and, hence
the set of available enforcement mechanisms is varied across three treatments applied during
the second round. In one treatment the agreements are perfectly exogenously enforced by the
experimenter. In another, agreements are enforced only by intrinsic motivations (e.g., altruism
and guilt) because people can secretly defect from the agreement after observing the outcome
of their gamble. And in the third, people can defect from their groups after realizing their
gamble only if they are willing to announce their defection to everyone in the session. So, in
this treatment agreements can be enforced by extrinsic incentives in the form of social sanctions
(e.g., shaming, or some form of threatened exclusion).
Using the resulting data, Barr and Genicot (2008) have shown that when the risk sharing
agreements are externally enforced by the experimenter individuals are most likely to enter into
such agreements, although even then many potentially benecial agreements are not entered
into. They also show that it is only under this treatment that risk sharing group members
engage in more risk taking. And nally they nd that, in disagreement with the theoretical
literature cited above, individuals are least likely to enter into risk sharing arrangements when
enforcement through some form of social sanctioning is possible. They then go on to show
that this third nding is consistent with two theoretical explanations: either social sanctions,
especially in the form of full or partial exclusion, are costly to inict; or individuals su¤er from
time-inconsistent preferences. However, the experimental data alone did not allow them to test
these theories.
In this paper our primary focus is who chooses to enter into a risk sharing arrangement
with whom under each of the three di¤erent institutional environments. We investigate this by
combining the experimental data with data from a survey and a genealogical mapping exercise
conducted on the same households. The two additional sources of information provide a rich
4
description of the economic and social backgrounds of the experimental participants, including
data on kinship and marriage ties between them, and on the various religious congregations,
groups and societies to which they belong. We apply dyadic regression analysis to this data.
Our ndings can be summarized as follows. Individuals are more likely to group together the
more similar they are in terms of age and gender, the more closely related they are genetically,
and the more memberships in organizations with an economic purpose they have in common.
However, genetically related individuals tend to distrust one another and so do not group when
enforcement depends on intrinsic motivations alone. When endogenous intrinsic incentives can
also provide a basis for enforcement, the relatively robust relationships associated with belong-
ing to the same religious congregation and being related by marriage come to the fore, while
co-members in economic organizations tend not to group, possibly because they wish to protect
their relatively vulnerable but highly valued relationships. We found no evidence of assortative
grouping on risk preferences, possibly because other concerns such as the costs of group forma-
tion and issues of enforcement prevailed. However, ex post, co-group membersgamble choices
converge.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 by explaining the experimental
design, conceptual framework and testing strategy. Data sources and variable construction are
discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we present results from the group formation regressions.
Section 5 investigates convergence in risk taking behaviour within groups. Section 6 concludes.
2 Empirical strategy
2.1 Experimental design
The experiment was organized around a risk preference elicitation game. One series of two
experimental rounds was played in each village, the rounds each taking between one and two
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hours and being held on consecutive days. In every village, each household was invited to send
one adult, preferably the household head or his/her spouse, to the series in their village. In
the rst round, played on day 1, each participant was interviewed privately and asked to select
one of six possible gambles g, ranked from the least (1) to the most risky (6). The gamble
choice set was the same for all participants. Riskier gambles had higher expected returns. This
game structure was originally used by Binswanger (1980) to elicit risk preferences: the choice of
gamble implies a range of possible values for the individuals coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
The gambles used in our experiment are presented in Table 1 together with the implied ranges
of the risk aversion coe¢ cient.2
At the end of the rst round, participants were invited to return and play the gamble choice
game again the next day. Participants were then given the opportunity to form sharing groups
with other participants from the same village. Within sharing groups, second round winnings
were pooled and shared equally. The verbal framing of the game was kept to a minimum and, as
a consequence, can be likened to a variety of real life situations, including risk sharing, which has
been extensively studied in village communities (e.g. Udry 1994, Ligon et al. 2001, Fafchamps
and Lund 2003), and group lending with joint liability, a topic that has attracted signicant
attention recently (e.g. Besley and Coate 1995, Ghatak 2000, Ghatak 1999). There is no lending
in our experiment, but participants de facto invest a sure amount (gamble 1) into various risky
investments (gambles 2 to 6) see Table 1.3
We are interested in the e¤ect of the institutional environment on the composition of sharing
groups and the subsequent risk taking behavior of their members. So, we randomly assigned
2The gambles are expressed in Zimbabwean $. The o¢ cial exchange rate at the time of the experiment was
around Z$55 for US$1 while the black market rate was around 2.5 times that amount. In the areas where the
experiment was conducted and at the time of the experiments, the daily wage for a farm labourer was around
Z$200, similar in magnitude to the average winnings per round from the experiment of Z$158 in round 1 and
Z$172 in round 2.
3The experiment is also akin to a business partnership within which the returns from a series of risky invest-
ments are shared.
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villages to a control or one of three treatments during the second round. In the control villages,
the possibility of forming sharing groups was not o¤ered.4 The three treatments vary with
respect to the enforcement mechanisms available to keep people in their risk sharing groups ex
post.
In the rst treatment, risk sharing was exogenously enforced by the experimenter: having
joined a sharing group, the members could not subsequently change their mind. So, regardless
of the outcomes of all their gambles, their winnings were pooled and shared equally.
In the second treatment, members of sharing groups could secretly leave their groups, taking
their second round gamble winnings with them, after the outcome of their own gamble had been
realized. In that case, they did not receive a share of the winnings of others in their group. Since
defection is unobserved by other villagers, enforcement in this treatment can only be intrinsic,
i.e., it relies on individualspreferences for altruism, reciprocity, and avoiding feelings of guilt.
The third treatment di¤ers from the second in that members of sharing groups who chose to
leave had to conrm their decision in front of everyone participating in the same experimental
session. In this treatment, enforcement is extrinsic but endogenous in the sense that it relates to
the importance that individuals place on their repeated economic and social interactions within
the village and whether and how they think these interactions might be damaged should they
defect publicly during the experiment.
Under each treatment, the consequences of and rules relating to sharing group formation
and defection were explained to the participants at the end of the session on day 1. The second
round gamble choices were, once again, made during private interviews and no rules were applied
to or recommendations made concerning gamble choices within groups.
4Participants in control villages could have agreed to share the proceeds from the game amongst themselves
even though no mechanism to do so was provided as part of the game. However, ex post interviews with key
informants in each control village indicated that this did not happen.
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2.2 Conceptual framework
The principle objective of the paper is to explore the factors a¤ecting the formation of risk sharing
relationships. To this e¤ect we need a conceptual framework that will help us make sense of
di¤erent group formation decisions. Here, we rst discuss group formation under the assumption
that risk sharing arrangements are perfectly enforced. We then explore the implications of
di¤erent enforcement mechanisms.
There are two sources of e¢ ciency gain from risk sharing: the transfer of risk from more
risk averse to less risk averse agents; and the reduction in risk resulting from the pooling of
uncorrelated shocks. Our focus is the latter: the transfer of risk requires asymmetric contracts
in which the insured pays a premium to the insurer in exchange for insurance,5 whereas in our
experiment the sharing rules are symmetrical all participants face the same choice of gambles
and winnings are shared equally.
If there are no restrictions on how winnings are shared, e¢ ciency gains from risk pooling are
maximized when all risk averse participants join a single group. Pooling risk enables them to
take more risky gambles yielding a higher expected return. However, when group members are
forced to share equally, individuals with di¤erent risk preferences may prefer not to pool risk
with one another (e.g. Ho¤ 1996, Ghatak 2000).
The rationale for such equilibria can be understood with a simple example. Say there are
two possible gambles, one safe, one risky, and two types of agent, one moderately risk averse
and one very risk averse. Further assume that very risk averse agents prefer to choose the safe
gamble and pool risk, and moderately risk averse agents prefer the risky gamble but also derive
some benet from pooling. Forcing the two groups to pool their winnings may reduce the utility
5For a discussion of how this also applies to contracts enforced via repeated interaction, see for instance
Platteau (1995) and Fafchamps (1999).
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of both: very risk averse agents dislike the increase in risk associated with the gamble choices
of less risk averse agents, and less risk averse agents dislike the reduction in expected returns
associated with the gamble choices of the very risk averse agents. In these circumstances, we
expect to observe multiple groups sorted by risk preferences: less risk averse individuals join with
similar individuals and select high risk, high return gambles, while more risk averse individuals
join other, similarly risk averse individuals and select safe gambles.
Multiple risk pooling groups may also arise as a consequence of group formation costs. This
is because the marginal insurance benet from a larger group falls with group size, while the
marginal cost of adding a new member is likely to either remain constant or increase with group
size. The costs of group formation are likely to play a role in the experiment not least of all
because participants were given less than a day to form groups. In practice, many groups were
formed on the morning of day 2, while participants were registering for the second round. When
group size is constrained by group formation costs, assortative grouping by risk preferences may
still occur, but participants with similar risk preferences may be divided into several groups.
Furthermore, in the presence of group formation costs the net benet from risk pooling need not
be positive for individuals with low risk aversion. Consequently, such individuals are less likely
to group.
Group formation costs are likely to vary between pairs of agents depending on their individual
characteristics and geographical and social proximity (Jackson 2008), where the latter might
take the form of family ties or co-memberships in religious congregations or community-based
organizations. If such variations in group formation costs are signicant and large, assortative
matching by risk preferences may not take place.
Equipped with a better understanding of the factors a¤ecting group formation when the
agreements are exogenously enforced (treatment 1), we now explore the likely e¤ects of enforce-
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ment based on intrinsic and endogenous extrinsic incentives (treatments 2 and 3). We rst note
that, in the absence of intrinsic or endogenous extrinsic incentives, a participants best response
is to cheat, i.e., as long as other group members respect their promise to share their winnings,
it is always in a participants selsh interest to join a group, take the highest risk gamble, share
winnings if he realizes a low payo¤, and defect if he realizes a high payo¤. If all participants are
aware of this, it is not in anyones interest to form a group. Consequently, we expect groups to
be formed only by individuals who believe they face su¢ cient incentives intrinsic or extrinsic
not to cheat each other.
In treatment 2, only intrinsic incentives are at work. Consequently, we expect participants
to form groups with those who they are more inclined to trust, who they believe feel more
altruistic towards them or to whom they feel more altruistic. Participants may, in accordance
with Hamilton (1964), expect more altruism from close kin. They may also be more inclined
to trust those with whom they easily identify, such as participants of the same gender, age
cohort, or ethnicity (Akerlof and Kranton 2000), or with whom they share religious beliefs
and interact frequently via community-based organizations. So, we expect religion, kinship,
co-membership in various groups, and demographic similarities to be more strongly associated
with group formation under treatment 2 than under treatment 1. We also expect groups to be
smaller under treatment 2.
In treatment 3, while intrinsic incentives remain, extrinsic incentives are also brought into
play. In models of repeated interaction between self-interested agents à la Coate and Ravallion
(1993), enforcement is facilitated by agents anticipating, valuing and so wishing not to jeopardize
future interactions. In our experiment the risk sharing is not repeated. However, in treatment
3, because individuals can only defect publicly and because group formation is conducted non-
anonymously, the decision to group with another individual may take on the characteristics of one
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embedded within a series of repeated interactions. In this context, the extrinsic incentives that
are salient to the issue of enforcement relate to threatened reductions in the anticipated value
of future social or economic interactions. If an individual is excluded from future interactions
the value of those interactions is lost completely. And even if they are not excluded, the value
of the interactions may be reduced due to feelings of shame or a weakened bargaining position if
they publicly defect within the experiment. To the extent that this happens, we would expect,
rst, more group formation under treatment 3 than under treatment 2 and, second, for group
formation under treatment 3 to be more strongly associated with existing, repeated interactions
such as co-memberships in religious and community-based organizations, especially where those
interactions are voluntary.
However, it is important to bear in mind that, while the group formation under treatment 3
may be viewed as one in a series of repeated interactions, it still remains unique not least of all
in terms of the explicit nature of the rules that apply. And it is this uniqueness that provides
the most likely explanation as to why Barr and Genicot (2008) observed less group formation
under treatment 3 than under treatment 2. In the light of this nding Barr and Genicot (2008)
theoretically explored the implications of individuals e¤ectively asking themselves Is it worth
me jeopardizing my ongoing repeated interaction with j by joining the same group as j in this
unusual and unique situation and then having it turn sour because one of us cheats? They
formally show that, if either (1) extrinsic incentives involve costs of the type described above
not only for the cheater but also the cheated or (2) individuals have inconsistent time preferences
and so fear that they would defect on learning that the winnings from their gamble were high
even though they know that this would jeopardize or devalue anticipated future interactions,
then less group formation will occur under treatment 3 than under treatment 2. Both theories
also predict that pairs of individuals who are involved in highly valued repeated interactions,
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especially where continued involvement is voluntary, will refrain from grouping under treatment
3 but, ceteris paribus, not under treatment 2. Here, by aligning the experimental data with data
on existing repeated interactions through kinship, religious and community-based organization
memberships, we can test this second prediction.
To summarize: pairs of individuals who are linked by existing relationships and are demo-
graphically similar may face lower group formation costs and so may be more likely to group
under all three treatments; existing relationships and demographic similarities that are associ-
ated with altruism and mutual trust are likely to be even more important under treatment 2
than under treatment 1; the value of the future series of interactions associated with a relation-
ship and how voluntary that relationship is, could enhance the extrinsic incentives that support
group formation under treatment 3, however, pairs of individuals with such relationships may
choose not to group during the experiment in order to protect these relationships from the un-
avoidable consequences of one or other party succumbing to the temptation to defect; and group
formation may be assortative with respect to risk preferences, although this e¤ect may not be
observed if the other aforementioned factors vary greatly across potential co-grouping pairs.
And what if group formation is not assortative on risk preferences due to prevailing varia-
tions in other factors? Should we expect group joining individuals to adjust their risk taking
behaviour to bring it into line with the preferences of their group? If neither enforcement nor
self-commitment were an issue, we would expect grouping individuals to take more risk in the
second round since group formation reduces individual exposure to risk. And, having controlled
for this, we would also expect individuals risk taking in the second round to be correlated
with their risk preferences, as revealed by their rst round gamble choices. However, if enforce-
ment and self-commitment concerns remain after the group formation decisions have been made
risk-taking in the second round may deviate from this prescribed pattern.
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First, consider the issue of self-commitment under treatment 3: a grouping individual, who
fears the temptation to defect in public should his gamble yield a high payo¤, may choose a
low-return-low-risk gamble in order to minimize that temptation. And second, consider the
importance of signaling an intention not to defect in treatments 2 and 3: being able to state
with conviction that one chose a relatively low-return-low-risk gamble in the second round is
an e¤ective way of signaling an intention not to defect.6 Finally, under all three treatments,
we might expect co-group members who are heterogeneous in terms of their risk preferences to
negotiate an agreement to converge on a set of gamble choices that, at least to some extent,
suites their collective preferences. The experimental design provided no mechanism whereby
such agreements could be enforced, but to the extent that group members may be coerced into
revealing their gamble choices and outcomes ex post, pressure could have been brought to bear
on those choosing gambles deemed too risky or too safe.
Having summarized the salient predictions from the literature, we turn to the empirical test-
ing strategy. This is organized around two sets of regressions, one focusing on group formation,
the other on risk taking.
2.3 Empirical formulations: Group formation
To study group formation, we follow Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) and Arcand and Fafchamps
(2008) and estimate a dyadic regression model of the following form. Let mij = 1 if i forms
a risk pooling group with individual j, and 0 otherwise. The network matrix M  [mij ] is
symmetrical since mij = mji by construction. As noted by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), this
implies that the regressors must enter the regression model in symmetric form. We therefore
6This point has been explored in depth by Platteau (1996) who argues that, in rural African societies, sharing
norms induce people not to seek personal enrichment. Risk taking is seen as an e¤ort to leave the group and rise
above ones peers and the consequent social pressure leads to conformism.
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estimate the following model:
mij = 1dij + 2tij + 3(tij  dij) + 4jzi   zj j
+5(zi + zj) + 6jg1i   g1j j+ 7(g1i + g1j ) + uij (1)
where dij is a vector of the characteristics of the relationship between individuals i and j, i.e.,
their social and geographic proximity and indicators of whether they are engaging in repeated
interactions and how voluntary those interactions are, tij is a vector of dummy variables in-
dicating which treatment individuals i and j played under, gki denotes the gamble choice of
individual i in round k = f1; 2g, zi is a vector of the relevant characteristics of individual i, and
1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; and 7 are the parameters to be estimated.
Regression model (1) is used to test the predictions presented in the previous subsection.
Regressor jg1i   g1j j is the di¤erence in gamble choices in Round 1, our proxy for di¤erences in
risk preferences. A signicantly negative coe¢ cient 6 is evidence of assortative grouping by
risk preferences. The prediction that less risk averse individuals are less likely to enter into risk
sharing is tested by including g1i + g
1
j as a regressor. A signicantly negative coe¢ cient 7 can
be taken as evidence in support of this prediction.
Tests of the predictions regarding the e¤ects of group formation costs, intrinsic motivations,
and endogenous extrinsic incentives relate to the signicance and the signs of the coe¢ cients
in 1; 3; and 4. Signicantly, positive elements in 1 can be taken as evidence that group
formation costs are important and decline with social proximity. Signicantly negative elements
in 4 can be taken as evidence that is and js who are more similar in terms of characteristics z
are more likely to join the same group, most probably because they face lower group formation
costs. We shall look in more detail at predictions relating 3 after we have presented our data.
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Signicant elements in 2, identify the impact of the treatments on the likelihood of any
individual joining a group. A negative coe¢ cient on a dummy variable indicating treatment 2
and a larger negative coe¢ cient on a dummy variable indicating treatment 3 would be consistent
with the ndings of Barr and Genicot (2008).
Finally, signicant elements in 5 identify individual characteristics that are associated with
the formation of groups. To see why, suppose that individuals with a large value of z form larger
groups. This implies that E[mij ] is an increasing function of zi + zj and hence that 5 is
positive.
Model (1) is estimated using a logit. When estimating model (1) it is essential to correct stan-
dard errors for non-independence across observations. Non-independence arises in part because
residuals from dyadic observations involving the same individual i are correlated negatively or
positively with each other. Standard errors can be corrected for this type of non-independence
by clustering either by dyad as proposed by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), or by village (and,
hence, experimental session). The second approach corrects for possible non-independence not
only within dyadic pairs sharing a common element but also across all the dyads participating
in the same experimental session. Because we have data from 14 village sessions we are able to
apply the second, more rigorous approach. In addition, in some specications we include village
xed e¤ects to control for all village-level unobservables. Their inclusion renders pure treatment
e¤ects unidentiable, but enhances the robustness of all the other estimated coe¢ cients.
2.4 Empirical formulations: Risk taking after group formation
In their original analysis of the experimental data, Barr and Genicot (2008) found that group
members engaged in more risk taking only under treatment 1, when the risk sharing arrange-
ments were exogenously and perfectly enforced. This is consistent with the hypothesis presented
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above that issues of self-commitment and signaling my cause relatively risk neutral group mem-
bers to choose less risky gambles in the second round under treatments 2 and 3. Here, to
investigate this issue further, we look for evidence of convergence in gamble choices within
groups and variations in the tendency to converge across treatments.
To test this hypothesis we estimate a model of the form:
jg2i   g2j j = 0mij + 1dij + 2tij + 3(tij mij) + 4jzi   zj j
+5(zi + zj) + 6jg1i   g1j j+ 7(g1i + g1j ) + uij (2)
Where, as before, gki represents is gamble choice in round k and the dependent variable jg2i  g2j j
is the absolute di¤erence between i0s and j0s gamble choices in Round 2. If participants played
in Round 2 as they played in Round 1, 6 = 1. If 0 < 6 < 1, it indicates that there is
convergence in behavior irrespective of group membership: participants choose more similar
gambles in Round 2 than in Round 1, perhaps because of learning. Conditional on this, if co-
group members converge in terms of their gamble choices, then we should observe 0 < 0 and if
the extent of this convergence is greater under treatments 2 and 3 due to issues of self-control
and signaling and we use treatment 1 as the basis for comparison, we should observe 3 < 0.
If there is assortative grouping by risk preferences, we would expect gamble choices in Round
2 to be strongly correlated with gamble choices in Round 1. Under this scenario, having con-
trolled for Round 1 gamble choices and found 0 < 6 < 1, we would expect 0 = 0. If, on the
other hand, the e¤ects of variable group formation costs, intrinsic motivations, and endogenous
extrinsic incentives prevail and, hence, bring together individuals with di¤erent risk preferences,
one may expect little or no correlation between Round 1 and 2 gamble choices  6 = 0 or
small but convergence in Round 2 gamble choices 0 < 0 if co-group members moderate
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their gamble choices so as to bring them into line with the risk preference prole of the group.
And, once again, if the extent of this convergence is greater under treatments 2 and 3 we should
observe 3 < 0.
3 The data
The experiments were conducted in 23 Zimbabwean villages in 2001. In this paper we use the
data from 14 of these villages. Of the remaining 9, 3 made up the control sample in which
no group formation was allowed and 6 were not fully enumerated during the various surveys
upon which we draw. Of the 14 villages in our sample, 10 were established in the early 1980s
as result of land redistribution. These resettled villages are relatively small and geographically
concentrated. Due to the random selection of settlers, the inhabitants of these villages are less
likely to have kinship ties to each other. However, they engage more in associational activity
and have more marriage ties within the village (. Barr 2004, Dekker 2004)
The participantsindividual characteristics, including their age, gender, education level and
their position within the household, were collected at the time of the experiment. Data on
household incomes and wealth (in livestock) are obtained from the Zimbabwe Rural House-
hold Dynamics Study (ZRHDS), collected by Bill Kinsey and composed by Owens and Hans
Hoogeveen. Kinsey, Burger and Gunning (1998), Gunning, Hoddinott, Kinsey and Owens
(2000), and Hoogeveen and Kinsey (2001) discuss this dataset in detail.
The data on memberships in various religious and civil groups and organizations are drawn
from a survey by Barr in 2000 (see Barr (2004) for details). For the purpose of the analysis
presented here, civil groups and organizations are divided into those that have an explicit eco-
nomic purpose e.g., micro-nance, mutual insurance, funeral societies, irrigation and livestock
rearing cooperatives  and those that are primarily social  e.g., sports and dance clubs and
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choirs. Co-memberships in the former are assumed to be both voluntary and associated with
valuable series of repeated interactions. Co-memberships in the latter, while voluntary are as-
sumed to be less valuable. Co-memberships in religious organizations are assumed to be less
voluntary in the sense that an individual who wishes to express their religious convictions must
tolerate their co-congregationists and less valuable in the sense that it is not the relationships
with co-congregationists that are the principal concern in this context, but rather the act of
worship and the expression of religious convictions. This notwithstanding, co-memberships in
religions may support mutual trust.
We also have detailed information on the family and marriage ties between the participants.
These kinship data are derived from specically designed social mapping exercises conducted in
1991 and 2001 by focus village groups involving at least one representative from each household
residing in each village (Dekker 2004). Blood ties are assumed to be associated with altruism
and to be involuntary. Marriage ties between in-laws  recall that our design precluded married
couples turning up to sessions are associated with many reciprocal obligations in Zimbabwe
and may be highly valued as a result. However, they are not voluntary in the sense that, no
matter how displeased a Zimbabwean is with his in-laws the reciprocal obligations remain and
the repeated interaction is highly likely to continue.7
Combining the assumptions stated here about the characteristics of the di¤erent ties that
might exist within dyads and are captured by our data with our earlier predictions relating to
the impact of the set of available enforcement mechanisms on group formation we can make
the following statements about coe¢ cients 3 in model (1). Signicantly positive coe¢ cients
on interactions between the treatment 2 dummy and the tie characteristics described in the
7We have no information on geographical proximity. However, given that average proximity varies village by
village, with resettled villages tending to be more nuclear and traditional villages more disbursed, the inclusion
of village xed e¤ects in the analysis should control for a substantial part of any geographical proximity e¤ect.
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preceding two paragraphs can be taken as evidence that intrinsic motivations are important and
will identify the types of relationships that are associated with altruism and trust. A signicantly
positive coe¢ cient on the interaction between the treatment 3 dummy and co-memberships in
organizations with an economic purpose can be taken as evidence that voluntarily repeated
interaction is facilitating enforcement in the experiment. A signicantly negative coe¢ cient
on the interaction between the treatment 3 dummy and co-memberships in organizations with
an economic purpose can be taken as evidence that individuals are choosing to protect these
relationships from the unavoidable consequences of a party to such a relationship being tempted
to defect within the experiment. And signicantly positive coe¢ cients on interactions between
the treatment 3 dummy and other tie characteristics can be taken as evidence that these tie
characteristics provide a conducive environment of enforcement through endogenous extrinsic
incentives. Here, the less vulnerable marriage ties and co-memberships in religious congregations
might be of importance.
4 Summary statistics
Table 2 presents the characteristics of the 382 participants who took part in both rounds of
the experiment in the 14 villages.8 These observations form the basis for our analysis. Across
the sample just under half of the participants joined sharing groups in the second round. The
sample is evenly split between men and women. The average participant is middle-aged and
has slightly more than primary education. Two thirds of the sample is married and is either a
household head or the spouse of a household head. Both annual household monetary income
8Of the participants in the rst round in these villages, 19 did not turn up on the second day, sending a
replacement from the same household in their stead. Because we do not have rst round gamble choice data for
the replacements, they are excluded from the analysis that follows. However, if we do not control for gamble
choice in the group formation regressions and include the replacements, the other ndings remain qualitively
unchanged.
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and livestock wealth are approximately log-normally distributed and are incorporated into the
analysis in log form.9
With respect to membership in various groups and organizations, we see that the majority
of participants belong to a religious group most often one of the many apostolic religions
indigenous to Zimbabwe. On average, participants belong to between three and four economic
groups and between no and one social group.
Turning now to the characteristics of the relationships between the participants, we rst
use the kinship data to construct a relatedness variable indicating the proportion of genes two
individuals are likely to share. A mother and her child, for instance, share half of their genes 
the other half of the childs genes being provided by the father. Two siblings are also expected
to share half of their genes. Among non-human species there is now a considerable body of
evidence supporting Hamiltons hypothesis that altruism is positively associated with relatedness
(Brembs 2001).
We also construct a network measure of social proximity due to marriage. To this e¤ect, we
begin by constructing, for each village, a social network based on available information on blood
and marriage ties across all adult members of the village. Then we calculate the distance within
this network between all villagers i and j, where distance is dened as the length of the shortest
path between i and j. When i and j are not in the same component of this network, the distance
between them is not dened i.e., it is innite. To overcome this practical di¢ culty, we follow
Fafchamps, Goyal and van der Leij (2005) and use proximity dened as 1=distance, instead.
Note that in our analysis this variable identies in-laws as spouses are in the same household.
Finally, to isolate the e¤ect of proximity due to marriage, we set the resulting proximity variable
9To avoid losing observations with no income or livestock wealth, we use log(crop income+1) and log(livestock
wealth+1), where livestock wealth is measured in money terms using local market prices for trained oxen, data
on numbers of livestock of di¤erent types and applying the following weights during calculations: trained oxen
1.00; cow 0.71; bull 0.83; young oxen 0.59; calf 0.18; sheep 0.08; goat 0.06; pig 0.06 (Hoogeveen and Kinsey 2001)
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equal to zero if i and j are genetically related.
Table 3 summarizes the data on the characteristics of the link between the experimental
participants. Only pairs from the same village are considered. We see that only 7% of all
possible within-village pairs of participants joined the same risk sharing group. Even under
treatment 1 where there was perfect exogenous enforcement, only 12% of the pairs joined the
same group well below the 100% required for e¢ cient risk sharing (without transactions costs).
This suggests either that the equal sharing rule prevented the formation of groups by participants
with dissimilar risk preferences, or that group formation costs and enforcement issues prevailed
in their a¤ect on grouping decisions. We revisit this point in the next section.
Only 21% of the pairs are co-members of the same religion. This reects the diversity of
faiths present in each of the studied villages. The average pair has just under one economic
group memberships in common, but few share a social group membership. There is, however,
signicant variation in both co-group memberships variables, with the maxima for common
economic and common social group memberships being 9 and 2 respectively. The relatedness
variable takes values between zero and 0.5 (the theoretically possible maximum in the absence of
in-breeding). However, for all but 2 percent of the dyads in our sample relatedness is zero and,
as a consequence, average relatedness is very low. This is due to the prevalence in our sample
of resettled villages which at their inception were made up of stranger households. Furthermore
each household could only send one participant to the experimental sessions. Social proximity
due to marriage is more commonplace: this variable takes a value greater than zero for almost
20 percent of the dyadic sample, with the maximum value being 0.5 (indicating parents-in-
law or siblings-in-law). The relative prevalence of marriage ties has been emphasized by Dekker
(2004) who found that, in resettled villages, marriage has been used to create social ties between
households that initially shared nothing in common.
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The dyadic sample is unbalanced across treatments, with treatment 2 being under-represented.
This is the result of having to drop a number of villages due to incomplete data. The dyadic data
on gamble choices is presented in the last panel of Table 3. Since the gamble choice variables
take values from 1 to 6, the maximum di¤erence in gamble choices is 5 and the maximum sum
is 12. The average absolute di¤erence is 1.23 in round 1 and 1.13 in round 2, suggesting some
convergence in gamble choices between the two rounds. We also see that the average sum of
gambles gi+gj rises between the two rounds, supporting Barr and Genicot (2008)s nding that
some participants chose riskier gambles in the second round.
5 Empirical results: Group formation
The coe¢ cient estimates for model (1) are presented in Table 4. The logit regression in the rst
column includes treatment dummies but no village xed e¤ects and no interaction terms. The
value of this regression is that it identies the raw treatment e¤ects. In the second column the
treatment dummies are replace with a full set of village xed e¤ects. This regression is reported
merely as a stepping-stone. The regression in the third column includes the all important
interaction terms between treatments and the variables capturing the characteristics of the
dyadic relationships.
We begin by noting that neither the di¤erence nor the sum of rst round gamble choices is
ever signicant. That 6 is not signicantly di¤erent from zero implies that group formation is
not assortative with respect to risk preferences. And that 7 is not signicantly di¤erent from
zero implies that more risk averse individuals are no more likely to join sharing groups  or
to join larger groups. These results suggest that the sharing groups were not formed in a way
that would have maximized the mutual welfare gains from risk sharing in the absence of group
formation costs. They are consistent with earlier ndings based on survey data. For instance,
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Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) and De Weerdt and Fafchamps (2007) both nd that risk sharing
relationships are no more likely between individuals with di¤erent risk proles or abilities to
bear risk.
This notwithstanding, there is evidence of assortative grouping with respect to gender and
age, suggesting that participants nd group formation less costly with others who are like them-
selves. Participants also nd group formation less costly with co-members of economic groups
and with blood relatives, although being related by marriage does not appear to be associated
with lower group formation costs and neither does belonging to the same religion or choir, sports,
or dance club.
Turning to the coe¢ cients on the treatment dummies and interaction terms, we see that, in
accordance with Barr and Genicot (2008), there is less group formation in treatment 3 with
extrinsic incentives. Treatment 2 is intermediate in terms of group formation, but statistically
indistinguishable from treatment 1. Surprisingly, blood relatives are signicantly less likely
to group under treatment 2 suggesting that there is distrust or possibly rivalry between family
members who live in di¤erent households. However, it is important to bear in mind that only 2%
of the dyads in our sample are genetically related and that this very small proportion is then sub-
divided across the three treatments. Under treatment 3, co-members in economic organizations
are signicantly less likely to group, suggesting that valuable, voluntary relationships may be
protected. In contrast, those belonging to the same religious congregation and those who are
related by marriage are signicantly more likely to group under this treatment, suggesting that
these relatively involuntary, ongoing relationships that are associated with either an established
moral code or well dened reciprocal obligations provide a good support for enforcement through
endogenous, extrinsic incentives.
To investigate whether established moral codes associated with religious a¢ liations are im-
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portant, we divide religious a¢ liation into two groups, apostolic and non-apostolic. In the study
area religious a¢ liation is diverse but there are many di¤erences in ethos between non-apostolic
religions mostly Catholics and Protestants and apostolic faiths which combine an evangel-
ical outlook with an emphasis on local religious visionaries.10 For our purpose, the di¤erence is
of interest because of the emphasis that apostolic faiths put on public contrition. Treatment 3
mimics the public contrition process and the peer pressure that goes with it. Hence, members
of apostolic faiths may better understand and value the enforcement mechanism available to
them under treatment 3 and may, as a consequence, be more likely to group. In addition, this
dissection of the religious co-membership variable may identify the e¤ects of di¤erent established
moral codes on intrinsic incentives.
The rst column of Table 5 contains the salient coe¢ cient from the regression presented in the
third column of Table 4. Then, in the second column of Table 5 we present the salient coe¢ cients
from a regression that di¤ers only in as much as we separate out co-memberships in non-apostolic
and apostolic congregations. Thus, we see that both types of faith play a role in the signicance
of religious co-memberships in treatment 3 (coe¢ cients statistically indistinguishable), while the
apostolic faiths may provide better support for enforcement based on intrinsic incentives alone.
One other signicant result is worthy of note. The signicant positive coe¢ cient on the sum
of years of schooling indicates that more educated participants were more likely to join sharing
groups and joined larger groups, possibly because they understood the insurance implications
more fully.
10For a description of apostolic groups in Zimbabwe and how they di¤er from traditional Christian faiths, the
reader is referred to Bourdillon, Mashita and Glickmann (1977) and Daneel (1977).
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6 Empirical results: Second round gamble choices
The estimated coe¢ cients for model (2), in which the dependent variable is the absolute di¤er-
ence in round 2 gamble choices, are presented in Table 6. As in Table 4, the regression in the
rst column contains treatment dummies but no village xed e¤ects, the regression in the second
column contains village xed e¤ects, but no treatment dummies, and the regression in the third
column contains village xed e¤ects and interaction terms between the co-group members (in
the experiment) indicator and the treatment dummies. Note, rst, that the coe¢ cient on the
di¤erence in round 1 gambles jg1i   g1j j is positive and signicant, but well below 1, in all three
regressions. This indicates that participants tended to converge on a sub-set of gamble choices
regardless of whether and how they chose to group. This may be due to learning. The regressions
also show that there was a further, separate convergence e¤ect associated with co-membership
in a sharing group and the regression in the third column indicates that this convergence e¤ect
was no stronger in treatments 2 and 3. Thus, while we nd no evidence of risk-taking in the
second round being a¤ected by issues of self-control or a desire to signal an intent not to defect
from a group, we do nd evidence of co-group members endeavouring to curb their risk-taking
behaviour to suit the risk preference portfolios of their groups.
Two other signicant results are worthy of note. First, older and better educated dyads
choose less similar gambles, possibly an indication that they know their own mind. And second,
co-memberships in both economic and purely social organizations are associated with less similar
gamble choices in round 2, while religious co-membership is associated with more similar gamble
choices. Possibly, while religions encourage conformity, other types of organization encourage
individual expression.
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7 Conclusion
It is common for households to pool risk, for instance through mutual insurance arrangements
or through group loans with joint liability. The mechanisms by which risk pooling arrangements
are enforced varies with the institutional and legal environment. Our aim was to investigate the
extent to which the enforcement mechanisms available a¤ect who shares risk with whom and
how this in turn a¤ects subsequent risk taking behavior. Our approach was to apply dyadic
regression analysis to data from a specically designed behavioral experiment, two surveys and
a genealogical mapping exercise.
We consider three types of contract enforcement mechanism perfect enforcement by an
outside party; enforcement through intrinsic incentives such as altruism and mutual trust; and
enforcement through endogenous, extrinsic incentives relating to the fear of partial or full ex-
clusion from future interactions.
We nd evidence of variations in group composition across the three treatments. Contrary
to expectations, genetic relatedness does not support enforcement based on intrinsic incentives,
even though it is associated with lower costs of group formation in general. Co-memberships
in community-based organizations that serve an economic purpose also appear to be associated
with lower group formation costs and may, due to their value and voluntary nature, also support
enforcement based on endogenous, extrinsic incentives. However, these qualities appear to lead
experimental participants to keep such relationships out of play, thereby protecting them from
the unavoidable consequences of someone being tempted to defect from their group within the
experiment. In contrast, religious co-memberships and marriage relations unequivocally support
enforcement based on endogenous, extrinsic incentives, possibly due to their less voluntary nature
and links to dened moral codes and obligations. Further, apostolic faiths appear to engender
trust or reciprocal altruism and, thus, support enforcement based on intrinsic motivations alone.
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Finally, while we found no evidence of assortative group formation based on risk preferences,
possibly because variations in other factors prevailed, we did nd evidence of convergence in
risk taking behaviour within groups ex post. And this convergence does not appear to be due to
individuals either aiming to reduce the temptation to defect or signaling their intention not to
defect. What remains to be investigated is whether this convergence is due to pure conformism
or the result of an unobserved negotiation process.
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Tables 
Table 1. Gamble choices in Z$ and implied relative risk aversion coefficients
Choice High payoff Low payoff EV RA class RA coeff.
1 100 100 100 Extreme infinity to 7.51
2 190 90 140 Severe 7.51 to 1.74
3 240 80 160 Intermediate 1.74 to 0.81
4 300 60 180 Moderate 0.81 to 0.32
5 380 20 200 Slight-neutral 0.32 to 0.00
6 400 0 200 Neutral-negative 0 to -ve infinity
 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of participants
Mean Std. Dev.
Subject Characteristics
Female 52%
Age 42.0 17.7
Years of schooling 6.8 3.2
Household head 42%
Spouse of household head 21%
Married 66%
Annual income (Zim$) 2562 3374
Value of livestock wealth (Zim$) 11656 10124
Belongs to a religious community 88%
Memberships in economic groups 3.30 2.85
Memberships in social group 0.38 0.61
Resettled household 76%
Experimental variables
Played under treatment 1 42%
Played under treatment 2 23%
Played under treatment 3 35%
Joined a group in round 2 49%
Average gamble choice in round 1 3.23 1.17
Average gamble choice in round 2 3.59 1.13
Observations 382
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics on dyadic data
Mean Std. Dev.
Group membership and social proximity:
Chose to join same group in experiment 7%
  Chose to join same group under treatment 1 12%
  Chose to join same group under treatment 2 8%
  Chose to join same group under treatment 3 2%
Belong to same religious group 20%
Co-memberships in economic groups 0.940 1.134
Co-memberships in social group 0.083 0.290
Hamilton's relatedness index 0.005 0.038
Proximity due to marriage 0.031 0.072
Treatments:
Treatment 1 (perfect, exogenous enforcement) 44%
Treatment 2 (intrinsic enforcement only) 16%
Treatment 3 (intrinsic and endogenous extrinsic) 40%
Gambles:
Difference in Round 1 gamble choice 1.230 1.066
Difference in Round 2 gamble choice 6.466 1.621
Sum of Round 1 gamble choices 1.144 1.005
Sum of Round 2 gamble choices 7.209 1.633
Observations 10470
 
Table 4. Dyadic regressions on membership in the same risk pooling group
(1)  (2)  (3)
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Risk aversion proxy
Absolute difference in 1st round gambles 0.052 0.066 0.004 0.093 0.003 0.093
Sum of first round gambles 0.037 0.054 0.025 0.052 0.030 0.052
Social proximity
Belong to same religious group 0.141 0.132 0.269 0.140 * 0.031 0.093
Co-memberships in economic groups 0.108 0.057 * 0.130 0.051 ** 0.141 0.057 **
Co-memberships in social group -0.151 0.185 -0.390 0.175 ** -0.323 0.336
Hamilton's relatedness 0.740 0.874 0.830 0.753 0.993 0.572 *
Related by marriage not blood (1/distance) 0.662 1.106 0.131 1.224 -0.807 1.902
Treatment effects 
T2 (intrinsic motivations only) -0.149 0.541
T3 (intrinsic and endogenous extrinsic) -1.769 0.330 ***
Treatment effects interacted with social proximity
T2 x belong to same religious group 0.258 0.196
T2 x comemberships in economic group 0.200 0.204
T2 x comemberships in social group -0.289 0.467
T2 x related by marriage not blood (1/distance) -1.315 1.987
T2 x Hamilton's relatedness -2.388 1.172 **
T3 x belong to same religious group 1.053 0.215 ***
T3 x comemberships in economic group -0.302 0.146 **
T3 x comemberships in social group 0.236 0.592
T3 x related by marriage not blood (1/distance) 4.560 2.616 *
T3 x related by blood (Hamilton's relatedness) 0.865 3.300
Absolute difference in individual characteristics
Difference in gender -1.903 0.425 *** -1.979 0.405 *** -1.997 0.391 ***
Difference in age -0.013 0.009 -0.016 0.008 ** -0.017 0.008 **
Difference in head or spouse dummy -0.235 0.187 -0.174 0.155 -0.171 0.157
Difference in years of schooling 0.022 0.041 0.028 0.043 0.026 0.043
Difference in log of household income 0.090 0.090 0.063 0.054 0.059 0.053
Difference in log of livestock wealth 0.036 0.051 0.014 0.038 0.010 0.037
Sum of individual characteristics
Sum of female dummies 0.101 0.116 -0.005 0.139 -0.006 0.144
Sum of ages 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.004
Sum of head and spouse dummies -0.142 0.167 0.121 0.141 0.105 0.136
Sum of years of schooling 0.039 0.036 0.065 0.032 ** 0.067 0.034 **
Sum of log household income -0.079 0.088 -0.034 0.075 -0.033 0.079
Sum of log of livestock wealth 0.060 0.045 0.006 0.038 0.004 0.040
Intercept -2.760 1.728 -2.441 1.373 * -2.320 1.400 *
Village dummies included no yes yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.171 0.215 0.224
Observations 10470 10470 10470
Notes: All standard errors adjusted to account for non-independence within villages; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at  
5%; * significant at 10%.  
Table 5. Investigating the source of the religion effect - apostolic or non-apostolic
   (1) (2)
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Social proximity
Belong to same religious group 0.093
Belong to same apostolic group 0.242
Belong to same non-apostolic religious group 0.170
Treatment effects interacted with social proximity
T2 x belong to same religious group 0.196
T2 x belong to same apostolic group 0.273 **
T2 x belong to same nonapostolic religious group 0.294
T3 x belong to same religious group 0.215 ***
T3 x belong to same apostolic group 0.358 ***
T3 x belong to same non-apostolic religious group 0.259 ***1.464
Notes: Coefficients and standard errors reported in column 1 are copied from regression (3), Table 4. Both regressions 
also contain all the other variables contained regression (3), Table 4. All standard errors adjusted to account for non-
independence within villages; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at  5%; * significant at 10%.
0.031
0.258
1.053
-0.209
0.202
0.581
0.010
0.991
 
Table 6. Difference in Round 2 gamble choices
(1)  (2)  (3)
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Co-group members
Belong to same risk pooling group -0.262 0.102 ** -0.277 0.112 ** -0.327 0.169 *
Treatment effects
T2 (intrinsic incentives) -0.377 0.060 ***
T3 (intrinsic and extrinsic incentives) -0.139 0.079
Treatment effects interacted with cogroup members
T2 x Belong to same risk pooling group 0.216 0.196
T3 x Belong to same risk pooling group 0.063 0.241
Risk aversion proxy
Absolute difference in 1st round gambles 0.092 0.036 ** 0.085 0.033 ** 0.085 0.033 **
Sum of first round gambles -0.049 0.022 ** -0.047 0.026 * -0.046 0.026 *
Social proximity
Belong to same religious group -0.071 0.036 * -0.074 0.037 * -0.076 0.039 *
Co-memberships in economic groups 0.068 0.034 * 0.068 0.034 * 0.068 0.035 *
Co-memberships in social group 0.159 0.067 ** 0.093 0.042 ** 0.092 0.043 **
Hamilton's relatedness -0.322 0.329 -0.343 0.316 -0.340 0.315
Related by marriage not blood, 1/distance -0.061 0.388 -0.103 0.436 -0.101 0.435
Absolute difference in individual characteristics
Difference female dummy 0.040 0.035 0.046 0.034 0.044 0.033
Difference in age 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.001 * 0.003 0.001 *
Difference head or spouse dummy -0.003 0.033 0.005 0.031 0.005 0.031
Difference in years of schooling -0.002 0.007 -0.005 0.007 -0.004 0.007
Difference in log income -0.031 0.023 -0.033 0.023 -0.033 0.023
Difference in log livestock equivalent -0.007 0.015 -0.005 0.014 -0.006 0.014
Sum of individual characteristics
Sum female dummy -0.094 0.052 * -0.065 0.057 -0.064 0.056
Sum of age 0.005 0.001 *** 0.004 0.002 ** 0.004 0.002 **
Sum head or spouse dummy 0.032 0.047 0.039 0.046 0.038 0.046
Sum in years of schooling 0.024 0.006 *** 0.027 0.007 *** 0.027 0.007 ***
Sum of log income 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.019 0.009 0.019
Sum of log livestock equivalent -0.006 0.011 -0.002 0.010 -0.002 0.010
Intercept 0.730 0.328 ** 0.378 0.336 0.378 0.334
Village dummies included no yes yes
Pseudo R-squared 0.070 0.084 0.084
Observations 10470 10470 10470
Notes: All standard errors adjusted to account for non-independence within villages; *** significant at 1%; ** significant at  
5%; * significant at 10%.  
